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The fighting on the Western Front during the First World War was 
characterized by the mass use of artillery and, thanks to scholarship from 
recent decades, is now understood as a crucible for learning and innovation.  
This article follows the trajectory of French artillery capabilities, mental and 






The First World War, fundamentally, was an artillery war. Central to every tactical 
question was the use of artillery: that of the attacker and the defender. The reason 
for this is largely technological. With the development of accurate, quick-firing 
artillery field armies would possess an unprecedented level of firepower. The 1890s 
introduced an era in which massed infantry charges could be largely turned back by 
artillery alone. These modern field guns could, if they chose, engage their targets 
from four to six kilometres away, thus freeing them from the constraints of their 
counterparts in the 1860s and 1870s, whose shorter ranges exposed them to deadly 
small arms fire. 
  
Against this new killing power there was little that infantry could do; little, that is, 
except dig. Trenches have always provided soldiers with protection from firepower. 
The same basic principles which Vauban had perfected in the 17th Century remained 
of vital importance well into the 20th. That the war on the Western Front was 
essentially a siege operation of unprecedented complexity and duration was not lost 
on the leadership of the French army. Joseph Joffre, commander-in-chief of the 
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French army from 1911 to 1916, frequently made statements such as, ‘[this war] is a 
siege; thus, long and difficult’.1 Such comparisons were not the sole purview of 
officers in GQG (Grand Quartier Général). General Cugnac, who commanded 18e DI 
(Division d’Infanterie) in 1915 stated that, ‘The old principle of our fathers remains 
true – you cannot attack a wall without having destroyed the bastions’ flanking 
positions, without demolishing the ramparts.’2  
  
The trenches and other field fortifications which stretched from the English Channel 
to the border of Switzerland from 1914–1918 were dug not only to protect the 
infantry from the awesome effects of modern firepower, but also in response to a 
force–space ratio which did not permit large-scale flanking manoeuvres. Any attack 
would have to be launched head on. This unprecedented defensive network posed a 
serious problem to any would-be attacker: how could a force successfully quit its 
protective trenches, cross open land, and then capture enemy trenches without 
suffering undue or, in any case, unsustainable losses. This problem was the central 
focus of military thought on the Western Front, and still generates a large part of 
the sustained interest in the First World War, scholarly and otherwise.3 Here, the 
parallels to old fashioned siege warfare begin to lose their relevance. The Central 
Powers were never going to be starved into submission without suffering serious 
military defeats, in the way a besieged town might. Likewise, the defensive structures 
built up and down the Western Front were easily and quickly replaceable. In a 
traditional siege one must only break the enemy defences once. On the Western 
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Front the defences might be broken only to have the enemy retreat a few miles and 
throw up a new, and perhaps even stronger, defensive position. In short, the 
problem was enduring.  
  
Leaving aside important political considerations like clearing the Germans out of 
occupied France and Belgium, the Allies were only ever going to win by attacking the 
increasingly strong German defences. Such attacks would be costly, and required 
overwhelming firepower to ensure success. Artillery was the only weapon which 
could destroy or neutralise enemy trench-works, and allow infantry to cross the 
killing zone and close with the enemy. This article will examine how French theory 
and practice concerning the employment of artillery changed as a result of the 
challenges posed by the Western Front. From the pre-war training of the French 
army, to the early battles of manoeuvre, through to the development of the trench 
network this article will map the evolution in French thought and practice in order 
to demonstrate not only that great strides and innovations were made in the First 
World War, but that they were made with startling speed. This speed is not only 
impressive in and of itself (having not yet been fully recognized by historians); it begs 
a reconsideration of developmental trajectory of armies on the Western Front.4 
Given the life or death pressures of war it should not be surprising that armies 
innovated rapidly to try to save lives and secure victory. What is amazing is how far 
they progressed from pre-war thinking and practice. 
 
Artillery from 1878–1914 
The vast majority of the guns that were available to France in 1914 were produced 
in the 1870s and 1880s. These guns, the de Bange series, accounted for two-thirds of 
the French arsenal (8,150 out of a total 12,214), yet only 120 of them were attached 
to active field units in August 1914 (a little more than one-third of the 308 heavy 
guns and mortars with which the French army marched to war).5 They were, in 
many ways, guns of a different era. Designed and crafted in the years after (and 
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largely in response to) the French humiliation in the Franco-Prussian War, the de 
Bange guns provided the range and power that French artillery had previously 
lacked. What the de Bange guns could not boast, however, was rapidity of fire. 
While the guns were ‘virtually brand new’ in 1914 (having never seen action), they 
were designed in a time before the invention of hydraulic recoil, which meant that 
the guns would have to be re-positioned and re-aimed after every shot.6 This being 
the case, they were only capable of three shots a minute under the best 
circumstances. In the field, one shot a minute was the norm. Compared to the 10 to 
15 shots a minute which more modern guns were capable of, the French reliance on 
the de Bange guns put them at a serious disadvantage. The French have been 
frequently slighted for having overly long artillery preparations in the First World 
War.7 It is worth remembering that these preparations were not long by choice, but 
by necessity. It took a certain amount of tonnage to destroy or neutralize enemy 
trenches. With guns that could only reasonably fire one round a minute the French 
had no choice but to let the guns take as long as needed if they wanted to have any 
reasonable chance of success. Barbed wire was never caught off-guard by a surprise 
attack. 
  
Recognising the inefficiency of the de Bange guns for modern warfare, the French 
army did attempt to retrofit many of the guns to make them more serviceable for 
operations on the Western Front. The de Bange 120L (long barrel), the most 
common de Bange heavy gun available, was the first in the French army to be fitted 
with motorised tractors, which greatly increased the guns’ mobility (although there 
seemed to never have been a large number of these tractor-pulled 120Ls).8 Likewise, 
plans were considered for retro-fitting 120Ls with the affût Mourcet, a crude recoil 
system, which would have increased their rate of fire. Ultimately, production of the 
affût Mourcet was not pursued; the French decided that the affût Mourcet would have 
been a waste in light of the 220 modern 105Ls that had been ordered soon after the 
outbreak of war in 1914.9 Unfortunately, it would take some time for these new 
guns to be produced and reach the front lines (the order only being completed in 
1916), which left the French with little option but to continue to slog on with its 
slow-cadence fire. This problem was exacerbated when the order of modern, quick-
firing 105Ls was reduced from 220 to a mere 36 after the decision was made to rely 
on modifying existing French 75s to allow them to play roles normally reserved for 
heavy guns. 
  
                                                     
6Gascouin, L’évolution de l’artillerie pendant la guerre, p. 28; « presque à l’état de neuf » 
7Goya, La chair et l’acier, p. 155 ; Barthélemy Edmond Palat, La grande guerre sur le 
front occidental, (Paris: Chapelot, 1927), p. 237 
8Gascouin, L’évolution de l’artillerie pendant la guerre, p. 33 
9Goya, La chair et l’acier, p. 161 
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While the French were trailing the Germans in terms of heavy artillery production, 
they led the world in field artillery. The vaunted French 75mm field gun had reigned 
supreme since its debut in 1897. The first gun to be fitted with a hydraulic recoil 
system, the French 75 was the world’s first modern artillery piece. Despite its early 
development, it remained a superior weapon, being markedly more effective than its 
German 77mm counterpart, which had been designed after the unveiling of the 75.10 
Even before war-time modifications the 75 boasted a longer range than the 77 (by 
1,000m). It was also quicker-firing, and more accurate. It would remain an important 
part of the French war machine throughout the conflict, taking on roles as diverse as 
counter-battery fire, wire-cutting, and the delivery of poison gas.  
  
Several attempts were made to enhance the accuracy and flexibility of the 75 in the 
years just before the outbreak of war. Most were attempts to get the 75 to fire a 
more arced shot, thus helping to overcome the shortage of high-arc heavy artillery 
that the French army suffered from (a shortfall made all the more evident by very 
public German advances in heavy artillery from 1905 onwards). The Plaquette 
Malandrin was one potential solution. It was, in essence, a set of wooden fins which 
attached to a 75mm shell, causing it to fall sharply as it lost momentum.11 The 
Plaquette saw limited use in the early years of the war, although assessing how often 
it was used and how effective it was is profoundly difficult. The only definite use of 
the plaquette known to the author was by the 34e DI in the build up to its attack on 
the village of Chantecler in June, 1915.12 Chantecler was elevated above the French 
position, rendering terrestrial observation all but impossible. Aerial reconnaissance 
could not discern damage done by plaquette-equipped 75mm shells from other 
damage done in the division’s preparatory bombardment (nor were they likely to 
have even tried). The 75’s limited payload and relative inefficacy against established 
trench-works obscures any inquiry into the practicality of the plaquette. If the 75 was 
not strong enough to tackle the defences around Chantecler it is irrelevant whether 
or not the sharp drop-off provided by the plaquette actually occurred. In the end, the 
verdict on the usefulness of the plaquette is probably best answered by its rarity in 
the source material. 
   
Eminently similar was the cartouche réduit (the ‘reduced cartridge’). The reduced 
cartridge manipulated the charge of each round in such a way as to cause the shell to 
fall abruptly, thus allowing the 75 to effect ‘plunging’ fire. This, however, came at a 
cost: the range of the 75mm was reduced from 6,500m to 2,000 to 4,000m.13 As 
with the plaquette, evidence of use of the reduced cartridge is slim. Ultimately, 
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13Gascouin, L’Evolution de l’artillerie pendant la guerre, p. 123 
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neither could hope to fill the role of heavy artillery, owing to the deficient range and 
striking power of the 75. A lack of modern heavy artillery (of which the French had 
only 104 pieces extant on the outbreak of war) was to be a major preoccupation of 
all armies on the Western Front (even the German) and was the primary driver 
which gave the early trench battles their shape and scope.  
  
If France was innovative in its field artillery design it was purely reactive in its 
approach to heavy artillery.14 Germany led the way with heavy gun production, and 
unveiled Europe’s first modern heavy artillery batteries to be organically attached to 
infantry formations. This forced the French military into an uncomfortable situation. 
Doctrinally the French did not see the need for heavy artillery batteries to be 
attached to infantry. Heavy artillery was reserved for sieges, a type of operation 
completely outside of the French emphasis on speed and mobility on the 
battlefield.15 Heavy artillery was worse than existing field guns at hitting exposed 
infantry, it was argued, which would make them an actual hindrance, not just an 
unnecessary expenditure.16 Supporting the bureaucratic inertia which hindered the 
French procurement of modern heavy artillery was a range of very valid questions. 
Would the heavy guns slow down the rapidly moving infantry and field guns? Would 
they ever be able to deploy in time to take part in the great battles of manoeuvre 
that were expected? How could the logistics network supply heavy guns with 
enough ammunition with the armies constantly on the move? How were artillery 
crews supposed to use guns whose range could be up to 10km when artillery crews 
could only observe fire up to 4km in the best of circumstances?  
  
By contrast, the strategic position of Germany made the adoption of heavy artillery 
batteries an absolute necessity. All along Germany’s western border were great 
forts (Liège, Namur, Verdun, Belfort) that Germany would have to assault eventually. 
The need to assault these forts, and to take them quickly, was reinforced by Alfred 
von Schlieffen’s estimation that France would need to be crushed in a few short 
weeks if Germany was to avoid fighting a two-front war with France and Russia. 
Germany’s early adoption of heavy artillery was not a result of great tactical 
foresight, but a response to clear and unavoidable strategic realities. France, on the 
other hand, did not expect to assault any major forts (aside, perhaps, from Metz), 
and expected to fight the next war in open terrain. Its doctrine and equipment 
reflected this. Bureaucratic inertia and budgetary insufficiencies kept the French from 
adopting modern heavy artillery until 1910; an act pursued more because the 
                                                     
14David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914, 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996), p. 57 
15Robert M Ripperger,‘The Development of French artillery for the Offensive, 1890-
1914’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 4, 1995, p. 616 
16Ibid, p. 607 
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Germans had heavy guns than because the French had in mind a specific role for 
them.17 It was then that the French first began to procure modern Rimailho 
155CTRs (court tir rapide) and 105Ls. This program was expanded under Joffre from 
1911, although it was not without incident; bureaucratic infighting would stunt or 
reduce many procurement efforts.18 As a result, the French army would have only 
140 modern heavy guns in August 1914: 104 155CTRs and 36 105Ls.19 
 
Pre-War Artillery Doctrine 
Discussing French doctrine before the Great War is not as straightforward as 
discussing hardware and procurement. This is largely because the French did not 
have a clear doctrine in the early 1900s. Douglas Porch claims that the French army 
of the early 1900s was simply incapable of producing or applying any set doctrine: a 
result of bureaucratic wrangling and even unprofessionalism.20 Porch attacks the 
French high command for trying to substitute metaphysical concepts like élan vitale 
(the idea that, by their very ‘Frenchness’, French soldiers could overcome modern 
firepower) in place of a modern, scientific doctrine. More accurate is Michel Goya’s 
assessment, which acknowledges the French army’s large body of doctrinal and 
theoretical writings on war, but still asserts that this disparate collection of works 
did not represent a true ‘doctrine’ in any meaningful sense of the word.21 Joffre 
himself admitted that the French had no real doctrine, at least up until 1911. In his 
memoirs he wrote that his primary goal upon becoming chef d’état-major général was 
the creation of ‘a firm doctrine for war, known by all and unanimously accepted’.22 If 
Goya is correct it is nevertheless still useful to examine some of the pre-war 
writings on artillery to get a sense of how influential members of the French military 
establishment were thinking.  
 
Hippolyte Langlois was one of the most important French military thinkers in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. Commissioned into the artillery in 1858 he went 
on to serve in the Army of Metz during the Franco-Prussian War. By the late 1880s 
he had become Colonel Langlois and was appointed professor of artillery at the 
                                                     
17Goya, La chair et l’acier, p. 160 
18Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, p. 31 
19Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, p. 29; Émile Gascouin, L’Evolution de l’Artillerie pendant la 
Guerre, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1920), p. 29 & Goya, La chair et l’acier, pp. 148 – 
150, 162 
20Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne: the French Army 1871-1914, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 214-6 
21Goya, La Chair et L’Acier, p. 110-2 
22Joseph Joffre, Mémoires du Maréchal Joffre (1910-1917), (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1932), 
p. 29; « Avant tout, il fallait doter notre armée d’une doctrine de guerre ferme, connue de 
tous, et unanimement acceptée »  
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École de Guerre. Langlois would go on to be a général de division (a two-star general). 
He served on the Conseil Supérieure de Guerre, and would be ultimately be elected 
into the Académie Française. After joining the École de Guerre Langlois embarked on 
an influential publishing career. In 1892 he produced L’artillerie de campagne en liaison 
avec les autres armes (‘Field artillery in liaison with other arms’). In this treatise 
Langlois stressed the importance of mobility and ‘dash’ in the artillery, which he 
considered to be uniquely French strengths, harking back to Napoleon.23  
  
Langlois was a firm proponent of the centrality of artillery to modern warfare. 
Artillery, he claimed, allowed the attacker to amass a local firepower advantage, and 
thus overwhelm the enemy at a chosen point. The idea of focusing on the decisive 
point (or schwerpunkt) was an idea rooted firmly in the campaigns and battles of 
Napoleon (one potential criticism of Langlois’s 1892 book is that certain passages 
are strongly Napoleonic with the infantry marching in column, trailed by a grand 
artillery train, etc.).24 It was a concept made all the more relevant, many felt, by the 
vast expansion of Continental armies. As one could now attack the enemy at 
virtually any point along a line extending hundreds of miles the choice of location for 
any attack was paramount. The process of concentrating force for a local attack 
without overly-weakening other sectors inspired much debate. Foch’s chapter 
L’Économie des Forces in Principes de la Guerre bears testament to this (and even opens 
with a quote from l’Empereur himself).25 That many batteries of artillery could be 
secretly concentrated at the decisive point, could fire simultaneously, and all on the 
same area, made artillery the principal and most powerful arm on the modern 
battlefield according to Langlois. Once engaged, the artillery should concentrate its 
bombardment, and blanket the enemy with shell-fire to catch hidden artillery 
emplacements and induce shock.26 Above all, this was to be done quickly: Langlois 
saw speed/tempo as the most important attribute for an attacker. Nevertheless, he 
did allow for changing circumstances in the field and held that, above all else ‘the 
position of the artillery ought to respond to the tactical goal’.27 
 
The foundation for the doctrine, however loosely defined, that informed the 
employment of French artillery in 1914 was laid in 1903. That year the French army 
produced the Règlement provisoire de manouvre de l’artillerie de campagne (Provisional 
                                                     
23Hippolyte Langlois, L’Artillerie de campagne en liaison avec les autres armes. (Paris: 
Librairie Militaire R. Chapelot, 1908), p. 247 
24Ibid, p. 278-84 
25Ferdinand Foch, Œuvres complètes, Tome I: Les Principes de la Guerre, (Paris: 
Economica, 2008), p. 168 
26Ripperger, ‘Development of French Artillery’, p. 601 
27Langois, L’Artillerie de campagne , p. 255; « la position de l’artillerie doit répondre au but 
tactique »  
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regulations for the manoeuvre of field artillery). The Règlement was a manual 
intended to cover the majority of aspects related to service in the artillery. As such, 
the first third of the Règlement deals entirely with training, gymnastics, and the 
proper forms of march and dress becoming of an artilleryman. The sheer amount of 
gymnastics in the Règlement is staggering, but we have to place it in the context of 
late 19th century France. In the years immediately after the humiliating defeat of 
1870-1 gymnastics were seen as offering France a way to better prepare its young 
men for a military life.28 Just as flying clubs proliferated in post-Versailles Germany, 
gymnasiums offered a pseudo-military outlet for French people (especially young 
men). This practice bled into military practice, and edged out some of the more 
practical and scientific aspects of artillery training. Ballistics and the higher art of 
artillery service, for example, are only belatedly covered.  
  
The Règlement broadly agrees with Langlois’ 1892 work, stating that ‘speed of fire is 
the essential property for field artillery’.29 Being written after the introduction of the 
French 75 it is not surprising that rapidity of fire was held to be of great importance. 
This emphasis on high-speed artillery fire (aimed over open sights) blanketing enemy 
positions with shrapnel was supported by Ferdinand Foch in his influential Principes 
de la Guerre (also published in 1903): ‘A quarter of an hour’s quick fire by mass 
artillery on a clearly determined objective will generally suffice to break its 
resistance, or at any rate make it uninhabitable, and therefore uninhabited’.30 
  
The Règlement anticipated the use of artillery at short to medium range (typically 
between 1,000 and 3,000 metres with 4,000 being the longest range discussed).31 
This was largely done to accommodate the observation of artillery fire, which the 
Règlement stated was to be done from within the immediate vicinity of the gun (in 
theory to allow for the gun fire to be quickly adjusted, ensuring accuracy). The 
Règlement does provide some equations for ascertaining the difference in altitude 
between the battery and its target, but failed to prepare artillerymen for firing from 
defilade or calculating wind resistance, the effects of barrel wear or other practical 
issues that a gun crew would have to consider in the field.32 One area in which the 
Règlement is reasonably advanced was in its discussion of tir progressif, in which an 
                                                     
28Eugen Weber, ‘Gymnastics and Sports in Fin-de-Siècle France: Opium of the 
Classes?’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 1, (Feb. 1971), p. 73. Weber’s 
article remains the classic work on the subject. 
29FRANCE, Règlement provisoire de manouvre de l’artillerie de campagne, p. 66; « La 
rapidité du tir…est la propriété essentielle du canon de campagne », (Paris : 1902) 
30Joseph C Arnold,‘French Tactical Doctrine 1870-1914’, Military Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 
02, 1978, p. 64 
31FRANCE, Règlement provisoire, pp. 92 & 130-143 
32Ibid, p. 109 
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artillery battery would fire two rounds per gun before increasing their range by 
100m and firing a further two rounds.33 This was repeated four times for a total of 
eight rounds fired in quick succession to create a sweeping effect of shell bursts over 
a designated area. This practice would not only become the standard procedure for 
anti-aircraft fire but would also be the rough model for what would become the 
‘rolling barrage’.34 
  
Contemporary wars naturally had an impact on how the French army thought about 
the use of artillery. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), for example, was held up as 
evidence to support the idea that guns were best employed atop hillocks, firing over 
open sights. This conclusion was based on the poor performance of the Russian 
artillery when it attempted to fire from defilade.35 The Russo-Japanese War was also 
used to support the French doctrine of blanketing enemy areas with shell fire; the 
argument was that the vast tonnages of munitions expended were proof that weight 
of metal was the most important factor in deciding victory. Interest in contemporary 
conflicts was pervasive. Just four years before his death Langlois published Lessons 
from Two Recent Wars, an analysis of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-8) and the South 
African War (1899-1902). In this volume Langlois discussed artillery in terms that 
were very firmly in line with wider French doctrinal thinking. The passive defence 
(an unacceptable option for the post-1871 French army) was derided as 
surrendering the initiative, and thus placing one’s troops at the mercy of enemy 
artillery, which would retain freedom of action and concentration. Langlois stated 
clearly that frontal attacks were inherently difficult and would likely be very costly (a 
long-standing concept in the French army, not a last-minute thought in 1913 as some 
have argued), but that technological developments still advantaged the attack over 
the defence.36 Langlois presciently discussed the value of ‘field fortifications’ 
(trenches), stating that: 
 
If…we were to construct numerous trenches forming a strong firing line, 
were to securely protect their flanks and support them in the rear by other 
trenches, one behind another, we should arrive at a position which would be 
invulnerable against artillery. This invulnerability would depend not so much 
                                                     
33Ibid, p. 93 
34Pierre Joseph Louis Alfred Dubois, L’Artillerie de Campagne dans la Guerre Actuelle 75 
& 90 (Paris: L. Fournier, 1916), pp. 163-165 
35Ripperger, ‘Development of French artillery’, p. 604 
36Paul Strong & Sanders Marble, Artillery in the Great War, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 
2011) 
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on the strength of any one or of the component parts, but on their number 
and their extension.37 
 
While Langlois is deserving of some praise for conceptualizing a grand network of 
field fortifications he failed to propose any methodology for dealing with them. In his 
book he did not discuss how such a defensive network could be attacked, nor did he 
suggest that such defences were invulnerable to artillery simply because French 
artillery was not heavy or powerful enough to attack them (a politically difficult thing 
to say, as the 75 was still embraced as the centrepiece of the French armoury).  
  
This unwillingness to stretch the analysis that final step to considering a solution for 
a very real problem (trench-digging had become a major component of field battles 
the world over in the early 1900s) persisted through to the outbreak of the Great 
War. The last major French work of doctrine to appear before the war was 1913’s 
Décret du 28 octobre 1913 Portant Règlement Sur la Conduite des Grandes Unités (service 
des armées en campagne): [Decree of 28 October 1913, Regulations for the Conduct 
of Grand Units (the service of armies in the field)]. The Decree relegated artillery to 
a greatly reduced role on the battlefield (far from its position as queen of the 
battlefield, conferred intellectually by Langlois, Foch, and others) stating that ‘the 
artillery has as its essential mission to support the forward movement of the 
infantry’.38 Artillery would help infantry get across the killing ground, but would do 
little else; it certainly would not be the principal arm on the battlefield. The 
regulations went even further to state that artillery’s role on the battlefield would be 
principally morale-centred (a boost for friendly troops, and a demoralizer for the 
enemy). Such an understanding of the utility of artillery on contemporary battlefields 
would be sorely tested in the Great War. 
 
La Guerre de Manœuvre 
1914 would prove to be a trying year for the French army. In its five months of war 
1914 would claim enough French casualties (301,000 dead, many more missing or 
wounded) to be the second-bloodiest year of the war for the French.39 To a large 
extent this was owing to the fact that the entire French army was engaged in regular 
battle. Poor French performance in battle, however, did not help. The artillery was 
frequently left behind by the infantry who would impetuously advance into battle 
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without waiting for artillery support. When artillery was brought to bear it was done 
on an entirely ad hoc basis, without liaison between batteries or a co-ordination of 
efforts across most formations.40 Despite this chaos there were instances in which 
French artillery was able to successfully intervene in a battle and influence the 
outcome of events. At times the artillery filled the role designated to it in pre-war 
doctrine firing over open sights upon massed German infantry.41  
  
These instances, combined with the celebrated performance of the 75 at the 1914 
Battle of the Marne, would cement in the minds of many the enduring centrality of 
field artillery, to the detriment of heavier guns.42 As the trenches were dug in late 
1914, however, the 75 began to show some of its inadequacies. Despite the fact that 
guns were firing at relatively short ranges artillery still had difficulties providing close 
infantry support. This was one of the major challenges for the French army from 
1915, and a range of solutions here proposed. Flares were probably the best and 
quickest option available. French flares came in three colours (green, red, and 
white), but were hindered by the fact that the white flare was practically invisible in 
daylight.43 As flares were not always abundant the use of flags and other visual 
symbols (including hand and arm signals) were encouraged, especially in 
communicating over relatively short ranges.44 Telephones were the clearest means 
of communication, but were subject to enemy fire, and also to accidental damage 
done by French infantry moving through the trenches. During the Second Battle of 
Champagne (September 1915) French formations tried to deal with the problem of 
close fire support by sewing white squares on the backs of advancing French 
infantrymen.45 The white squares would signal to the artillery where the front line 
was, allowing them to engage in close support with less fear of inflicting friendly fire 
casualties. This proved less than effective. 
  
Far more pressing than the difficulties regarding close fire support was the task of 
maintaining an adequate number of guns and shells in the field. French artillerymen 
were, on the whole, not taking very good care of their guns at a time when their 
guns were being asked to fire previously unthinkable quantities of munitions. Intense 
firing programs, such as those on which every attack relied, would cause many guns 
to fatally malfunction (typically, more guns were lost this way than were lost to 
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enemy action).46 From February 16–22 Fourth Army lost 10% of its field guns (86 of 
860) due to excessive barrel-wear and subsequent malfunction.47 34e DI, which had 
been a part of Fourth Army at the time, would again find itself suffering from gun 
shortages four months later. In its preparation for an attack on the village of 
Chantecler the division had only 20 fully-operational guns (six were firing at reduced 
capacity: four could only fire shrapnel shells for fear of causing a barrel rupture, and 
two were firing erratically); the division had effectively lost over one-third of its full 
paper compliment to malfunction.48  
  
While the number of guns lost to malfunction (including barrel rupture) were greatly 
reduced as the war continued (a result of meticulous barrel oiling and the increased 
use of replaceable barrels) it posed a serious industrial problem to the French war 
machine.49 The loss of France’s industrial north-east in the initial German advance of 
1914 put incredible strain on France’s ability to keep its armies supplied with the 
ever-increasing materiel needed to conduct modern war.50 The loss was especially 
trying as France did not simply need to replace spent munitions and lost weapons, 
but needed to create an entirely new armoury of heavy artillery, which was sorely 
lacking. This lack of modern weaponry made itself sorely felt in the initial trench 
battles.  
 
La Guerre de Tranchée 
In December 1914 the French army launched its first, concerted trench offensive. 
This effort, the First Battle of Artois, was launched by Tenth Army, under the 
command of General Louis de Maud’huy. Initially, Tenth Army’s three corps were to 
make a simultaneous assault aimed at capturing Notre Dame de Lorette, a 
dominating piece of high ground little over a kilometre north-west of Vimy Ridge. It 
was always going to be a difficult operation, but the lack of artillery exacerbated the 
situation. When it became clear that there was not enough heavy artillery to 
support the action the attacks were staggered to allow the artillery to concentrate 
on each sector in turn. Thus, the entirety of Tenth Army’s heavy artillery would 
support the actions of XXI CA on 16 December, X CA on the 17th, and then XXXIII 
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CA on 18 December.51 Despite this measure (which was not at all out of line with 
pre-war theories of concentration) the artillery preparation was still woefully 
inadequate.52  
  
The French simply did not have enough guns or shells to yet launch a successful 
attack against a well-defended trench network. As a stop-gap, increasing numbers of 
older guns (primarily de Bange) were being pressed into service, including the 58mm 
cannon, which would be one of the principal wire-cutting tools of the French in the 
early trench battles. These weapons, however, were not built for modern war, and 
had serious problems beyond their slow rate of fire. The 58mm was a notoriously 
inaccurate weapon; if it was not for its ability to fire 50kg shells at a high arc and at 
close range (mortar-fashion) it would likely not have been put into field service. 
Firing in a controlled test environment 58mm crews were unable to put more than 
one in five shells within five metres of the intended target.53 The inaccuracy of the 
58mm cannon was exacerbated by a quirk in the manufacturing of 58mm shells 
whereby some shells had their fins welded on and others were  bolted on. Shells 
with wings bolted on tended to lose those wings mid-flight, resulting in the shell 
landing on its side or rear and then failing to detonate.54 Fully 25% of shells with 
bolted-on fins failed to detonate for this reason. This put strain on logistical 
networks to provide more shells to make up for the ‘duds’, and also made essential 
preparatory tasks, like wire-cutting, all the more difficult. 
  
Despite the many technical and logistical difficulties with which the French 
contended in 1915, the year was full of important innovations. The truly complex 
nature of the problem facing any attacker in the war was understood by tactical 
commanders very quickly. Most celebrated among the ‘early adopters’ of artillery-
centred warfare is Andre Laffargue. A young officer who had served in the Artois 
region, Laffargue wrote a widely-distributed pamphlet entitled Étude sur l’attaque 
dans le période actuelle de la guerre: impressions et réflexions d’un commandant de 
compagnie (called ‘The Attack in Trench Warfare’ in its English translation) in 
response to what he felt were the ‘flagrant tactical failures’ of the French army up to 
that point.55 Read in all the major armies on the Western Front (copies were 
captured and translated by the Germans) the pamphlet set out a firepower-intensive 
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vision of how offensive trench battles should be conducted, while also stressing 
caution to avoid unnecessary infantry casualties. Laffargue gave artillery five key 
roles, most of which have to do with the destruction of enemy defences (he assigns 
separate roles for the destruction of barbed wire, trenches, and machineguns); the 
other two roles were counter-battery fire and the firing of a barrage to keep enemy 
reserves from joining the fight.56 Laffargue argued persuasively that the French army 
needed more mortars, as they were the best weapons available for wire-cutting 
according to Laffargue, and also advocated better reconnaissance and maps.57 
  
Despite Laffargue’s reputation in the historiography, it would be best to consider his 
work for its implication (that the French army was becoming more tactically refined) 
rather than its impact. Pamphlets read are not pamphlets followed, and there is a 
dearth of evidence to support there being any actual effect of Laffargue’s writing.58 
Furthermore, the ideas in Laffargue’s pamphlet were not particularly new when he 
published them in Autumn 1915. His emphasis on the importance of mapping and 
reconnaissance had already been laboured by Philippe Pétain (who had also served in 
Artois).59 Far worse, many of Laffargue’s firepower-intensive recommendations were 
already official doctrine by Spring 1915; thus raising the possibility that Laffargue’s 
pamphlet attacking French methodology was in fact inspired by existing French 
doctrine and methodology. What the historiography has seen up to now as a 
forward-looking cry in the wilderness by a desperate and intelligent young officer 
may well have been a simple act of plagiarism. 
  
In April 1915 the French army produced its first broad doctrine on trench warfare. 
The doctrine places artillery in a privileged position, as Laffargue would go on to do, 
and insisted that artillery prepare attacks methodically.60 The new doctrine assigned 
the artillery four roles (destruction of enemy defences, counter-battery fire, direct 
support of infantry attacks, and the bombardment of enemy soldiers), all of which 
broadly agree with the five roles that Laffargue would later propose. The importance 
of aerial reconnaissance was heavily stressed, as was adequate observation, 
reconnaissance, and mapping.61 Infantry-artillery liaison, especially via telephone, is 
held up as essential for the effective employment of artillery. This is in stark contrast 
to the pre-war army which assigned only 500m of telephone wire to each battery 
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(additional supplies were hurriedly purchased in Paris and Switzerland in the early 
months of the war).62 Heavy artillery and mortars are highlighted as the most 
important weapons for the destruction of enemy defences (especially barbed wire), 
while the 75 is given the bulk of the responsibility for engaging enemy infantry 
(through shrapnel barrages) and for counter-battery fire. In short, the French had 
managed to develop a fairly accurate understanding of the necessities of trench 
warfare within a few months of the solidification of the trench network along the 
Western Front. 
 
In this new model for trench warfare the famed French 75 saw a reduction in its role 
on the battlefield. Partially this was due to unchangeable facts of the 75mm design: it 
would forever be too weak, and fire shells at too flat a trajectory, to have a serious 
destructive impact against field fortifications. As such, the single most common 
French artillery piece could only be used in certain roles, such as the firing of 
barrages to hinder enemy movements or efforts at improving their trench 
network.63 The importance of the 75 would arguably continue to diminish as the war 
progressed, making way for the dominance of heavy artillery and mortars in the 
larger, later battles of the war. Even traditional field artillery roles, such as direct-fire 
support, were being eroded by light mortars (like the British Stokes mortar) and 
other trench guns, especially the 37mm.64 Nevertheless, the 75 did have serious 
contributions to make in the two most transformative artillery developments in 
1915: the rolling barrage and the delivery of asphyxiating gas shells. 
  
The rolling barrage was one of the most important artillery procedures in the First 
World War. In effect, a rolling barrage was an artillery barrage (a wall of fire and 
steel created by shrapnel or high explosive shells) which would advance at a set pace 
in order to provide a protective curtain for advancing infantry. Its use was a crucial 
means of suppressing enemy infantry, allowing advancing troops to cross the killing 
zone with minimal small arms interference. In theory, advancing troops would be 
able to reach an enemy trench before its would-be defenders had time to emerge 
from their deep dugouts. The close-range fighting that would ensue would strongly 
favour the attackers, especially if they were armed with sufficient grenades for 
engaging enemy troops still emerging from underground shelters. 
 
Historians cannot, and probably never will, agree on when the very first rolling 
barrage was; most, however, agree that it was used within the first year of trench 
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warfare on the Western Front.65 Its first inclusion in a grand work of French 
doctrine is easier (and potentially more important) to pinpoint. In the new trench 
warfare doctrine issued in April 1915 the rolling barrage is very clearly established as 
the standard procedure for any serious infantry attack: ‘at the hour fixed for the 
infantry attack the artillery will increase its range progressively to make, in front and 
on the flanks of the attack, a longitudinal and transversal barrage to shelter the 
infantry so they can advance’.66 That this fundamental trench tactic, which is 
frequently cited as first appearing in Autumn 1915, was elucidated as a key and basic 
aspect of French doctrine after a mere five months of trench warfare warrants a 
rethinking of the timeline along which Allied innovation and adaptation in the 
trenches took place. 
  
To illustrate the level of refinement achieved in rolling barrages in 1915 let us 
consider one early example. On 9 May 1915 77e Division d’Infanterie (DI), part of 
Philippe Pétain’s XXXIII Corps d’Armée (CA), fired one of the more successful 
barrages of the year. Starting at H-hour (10.00) the barrage rolled forward for ten 
minutes before resting at ouvrage 123 (a trench-work noted on divisional maps).67 
Here the barrage waited for a sign from the infantry to show that they too had 
reached ouvrage 123, and were ready to continue their attack. In doing so, it 
prevented the barrage from advancing too far beyond the advancing infantry, and 
also gave the artillery a chance to roll back the barrage to support the infantry if the 
attack stalled. The infantry, thanks to a detailed artillery preparation and well-paced 
rolling barrage, reached ouvrage 123 without meeting much organized resistance, and 
signalled their readiness to continue. As the barrage moved on from ouvrage 123 it 
fanned out towards the division’s different objectives. Arguably it did so too slowly 
(the division suffered vicious enemy flanking fire while advancing over open country 
behind the barrage). Nevertheless, it was a crucial aspect of the division’s attack 
which won some four kilometres of ground, 600 prisoners, and a handful of German 
machineguns and heavy artillery.68  
 
Equally important to the development of the rolling barrage was the development of 
artillery-delivered poison gas. After the Germans made the first successful 
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asphyxiating gas attack on 22 April 1915 the Allies were anxious to retaliate. The 
British would pin their hopes on an emulative gas attack (utilising a cloud of chlorine 
gas) during the battle of Loos on 25 September. The French asphyxiating gas 
programme, which had existed since January 1915, took a different path.69 The 
French examined the utility of chlorine clouds after Second Ypres, even to the point 
of making an organisation and doctrine for so-called ‘Z companies’ to deploy the gas, 
but were unable to source enough chlorine to actually launch such an attack.70 Even 
if enough chlorine had been on hand the French had a severe shortage of gas masks, 
which precluded infantry from advancing into the gassed area. As an alternative, the 
French began to experiment with delivering gas via artillery from May 1915. 
  
The delivery system which first found its way into use was a 75mm shell filled with a 
mixture of carbon disulphide (CS2) and phosphorus.71 This shell was not only 
asphyxiating but also incendiary (courtesy of the phosphorus), and produced 
prodigious quantities of smoke; attributes that combined to make it a potentially 
very effective counter-battery weapon. 10,000 CS2/P shells were produced in quick 
order (with a further 40,000 being ordered on 31 May), and on 10 June were being 
rushed to the front to be tested against the enemy. There would be no time for 
training artillery crews in the proper use of these new shells as the French were at 
that time in the final stages of preparing a renewed general offensive in the Artois 
region. Instead, instructions were simply sent forward with them detailing their 
proposed use. The instructions from Grand Quartier Général were that the shells 
were best used against fixed and flammable defences in the German rear areas. 
1,000 shells would need to be delivered quickly in order to inundate one hectare of 
terrain with enough gas to have an effect.72 This necessitated spreading the shells out 
amongst 75mm batteries to keep any one battery from having too great a load; the 
shells were highly unstable and GQG wanted to minimize the risk of gas being 
unleashed on friendly troops as a result of an untimely barrel rupture. 
 
The shells were first used on 16 June by IX, XX, and XXXIII CAs serving under 
Tenth Army, part of the Groupe Provisoire du Nord commanded by Foch. While the 
incendiary effects were far weaker than had been hoped (fires had been set in 
Angres, but apparently nowhere else), the overall effect of the shells had exceeded 
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expectations.73 Fired primarily against known concentrations of enemy batteries, the 
launch of gas shells silenced German artillery for an hour and a half across the front 
of XX CA, and seriously weakened the German artillery activity before IX CA.74 
Used again on 17 June the gas shells produced much the same effect, a silencing of 
the targeted batteries. Within a week and a half reports of these astounding results 
had reached the War Ministry where they were well received. Plans were 
immediately put into effect to vastly expand the use of poison gas shells by the 
French army, especially for the counter-battery role in which they had proven so 
effective. By the end of 1916 25% of all French shells produced would be for the 
delivery of poison gas; these shells formed a cornerstone of French artillery fire for 
the rest of the war.  
  
French artillery also improved its defensive policies.75 Joffre’s 1914 decree that 
artillery do more to hide its presence from German aircraft was expanded upon, and 
local corps and divisional commanders worked hard to ensure that their troops did 
not reveal too much to the Germans.76 Batteries were encouraged to move 
frequently between various pre-prepared emplacements, thus making them harder 
to detect and engage by the Germans.77 This suggestion was made along with the 
idea that batteries needed to keep better records on their target registration so that 
batteries could inherit an emplacement and not have to begin their registration from 
scratch, they would have pre-existing data to rely on. After the French successes 
with poison gas as a counter-battery weapon GQG recognized the importance of 
supplying French artilleurs with protection from gas to keep French batteries 
operational during battle.78 French artillery also worked to improve its defensive fire 
plans, emulating the Germans’ use of pre-sited artillery barrages to disrupt German 
attacks.79 Despite these and other French artillery refinements there were still 
certain problems which proved very difficult to solve. 
  
Enduring Challenges 
While the advances made in the early stages of the war were impressive, they still 
required extensive refining before they became the war-winning methodologies of 
1918. Technical problems posed by out-dated weapons could never be overcome; 
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the French would have to wait for the production of modern, quick-firing heavy 
artillery like the Rimailho 155mm court tir rapide. Not until such weapons were in 
abundance could the French consider reducing their extended artillery preparations 
before every attack (sometimes lasting a week or more).80 Likewise the problems 
posed by German counter-barrages, which were instrumental in halting French 
attacks in 1915, could not be easily solved, even with an extensive use of gas shells. 
As the Germans could fire pre-sited barrages against advancing French infantry they 
were able to remain silent (and therefore hidden) right up to the moment of attack. 
Pétain’s suggestion at the time was to use aerial assets to methodically map and 
observe German rear areas, and for counter-battery fire to be a better managed 
longue durée operation. 81 While counter-battery was already a routine activity, 
Pétain felt that too much was left to inaccurate reactionary barrages fired on the day 
of an attack when hidden German batteries suddenly began pouring fire into 
advancing poilus. As time progressed the French would get better at counter-battery 
fire, both in the long and short term. By 1917 then commander-in-chief Robert 
Nivelle would write that aircraft were essential for effective counter-battery fire in 
real time with one aircraft flying for two hours being able to facilitate the 
neutralisation of up to four enemy batteries.82 Such a feat was simply impossible in 
the early trench battles. 
  
Aerial reconnaissance and observation was a crucial component of Allied efforts. It 
was only from the sky that secondary German trench systems (frequently sited on 
reverse slopes, that made them incredibly difficult to hit) could usually be observed. 
General Marie Émile Fayolle wrote in his diary ‘as for taking many successive lines, 
those which we cannot see will be intact’; successful attacks relied on the accurate 
bombardment of these secondary German positions.83 Using aircraft to direct 
artillery fire, however, was very difficult. Aircraft could not do this if there was a 
great deal of artillery action on both sides: the job became too dangerous and 
observation too difficult. Aircraft could be fitted with radios (télégraphie sans fil, or 
TSF), but did not have enough power to house transmission and reception units: 
planes could only send information.84 The ground-based receptors were unwieldy 
and were best kept in one place, meaning that they could only service batteries cited 
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closely together. Signalling, therefore, was largely visual, which meant that it easily 
suffered from misinterpretation, if the signals were seen at all.  
  
Photography proved to be one of the best means by which aircraft could assist in 
tracking the development (or destruction) of enemy positions.85 While aerial 
photography became a cornerstone of the wider Allied artillery efforts, it remained 
open to misinterpretation. Pilots might have vastly differing opinions on the state of 
German trenches, creating an air of uncertainty about artillery preparations.86 
Balloons offered certain advantages to fixed-wing aircraft, not the least of them being 
speed and clarity of communication. Balloons, however, were highly vulnerable, and 
could not easily observe secondary German trench networks. There was no perfect 
answer to the Allies’ general lack of good terrestrial observation; the First World 
War was a war fought for observation posts (ridges) as much as anything. 
  
Of course the German defensive network was not static; it was ever evolving and 
improving to counter Allied improvements in offensive methodology. The Germans, 
like the French, started off with a largely improvised trench network in late 1914. 
Many parts of the front were poorly organised, as lines were dug based on the 
random chance of battle, rather than a rational assessment of the needs of the 
German army.87 This quickly changed. By mid-1915 the Germans began to take their 
trench defence much more seriously.88 Secondary positions were dug, and made as 
strong as their forward positions, to ensure that the Allies would not be able to 
‘breakthrough’ the German trench line out into the open. The German trenches 
were progressively moulded to lie on reverse slopes and to lure Allied attackers into 
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pre-determined fields of fire.89 German artillery made extensive efforts to assist in 
breaking up the coherence of any attack with pre-planned counter barrages. Small 
Allied improvements in methodology were quickly met with German counter-
measures. After the French proved the value of advancing above trenches rather 
than through them (to avoid slowing the impetus of the attack by forcing infantry 
through narrow German communication trenches) the Germans began to line even 
their communication trenches with barbed wire to make it difficult for French 
infantry advancing over the top to return to the trench network.90 It was this 
constant war of innovation between the Allies and the Germans that produced the 
stalemate on the Western Front, not a lack of imagination.  
 
The lessons and procedures learned in the early months of trench warfare continued 
to be refined as the war progressed. Artillery bombardments became increasingly 
scientific, and came to rely on sophisticated mathematics as indirect fire became 
commonplace (whether the target was behind a reverse slope, the battery was in 
defilade, or both).91 Of course, the mathematical skills of French artillerymen varied. 
Nevertheless they were expected from 1916 to be able to calculate the effects of 
atmospheric conditions on artillery fire, among other common range and accuracy 
modifiers.92 By 1916 French officers began to write about a more precise 
employment of artillery, rather than hoping for an increased mass of munitions. 
While in command of Sixth Army during the Battle of the Somme Fayolle implored 
his artillery to prioritise accuracy (saying that 1,000 shells will have no effect if not 
fired on a clear target), and also encouraged his artillery to aim for the neutralization 
of enemy trenches, rather than their outright destruction.93 This shift from 
destruction to neutralisation was a necessity. The French could never produce 
enough shells to absolutely flatten the entire German front. What shells the French 
had, needed to be applied carefully and precisely in order to maximise the return on 
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each shell fired. To facilitate this observation moved from the vicinity of the battery 
to forward posts which increased infantry morale, and yielded better results.  
  
Artillery doctrine also continued to be refined. In April 1916 Foch produced a 
substantial work of doctrine for his Groupe d’Armées du Nord called La Bataille 
Offensive (‘Offensive Battle’). In this work Foch claimed to be ‘adapting’ various GQG 
instructions to better fit ‘current circumstances’.94 La Bataille Offensive elucidates the 
situation facing the Allies: a lengthy war which much be fought methodically if it is to 
be won. The nature of this war meant making ‘larger and larger demands on our 
artillery, which alone is capable of destroying enemy defences’.95 Infantry were 
reduced to a secondary role; to be used only in limited numbers in order to avoid 
heavy casualties. Foch wrote that ‘the artillery preparation is the definitive measure 
of infantry possibilities’; these possibilities were limited to advances of two to four 
kilometres in a single bound, according to Foch.96 This being the case, battles needed 
to be thought of as ‘operations’ (although that word is not used). Thus, a series of 
small, artillery-dominated battles would be fought in succession to achieve a strategic 
aim. Ideas dating back to the writing of Langlois are brought up to explain the 
primacy of artillery on the battlefields of La Grande Guerre, including its ability to 
concentrate overwhelming fire. Furthermore, artillery could be used much more 
regularly and for a longer period of time before wearing out; infantry seemed to 
rapidly melt away once exposed to the war machine of earth, steel, and high 
explosives.97  
  
This is an articulation of the artillery war that would survive through to 1918. 
 
While improvements would still be made on the tactical and technical sides of 
artillery (the 1917 doctrine Instruction sur le tir d’artillerie was comprehensive 
regarding trench warfare; it was less effective for the war of movement in 1918), a 
clear conceptualisation of how artillery was going to be used in the First World War 
had emerged by early 1916.98 This was a great feat of adaptation and innovation. The 
French army in 1914 had found itself in a war it was not truly prepared to fight, with 
weapons largely ill-suited to the task. This state of unpreparedness and unfamiliarity 
was turned around far more quickly than anyone could have expected. While the 
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French would struggle in many of their operations in 1915, they ultimately mastered 
the complexities of industrial warfare from 1916 onwards. New technology, from 
poison gas to aeroplanes, were mastered and integrated into the French system. 
New procedures like the rolling barrage were quickly hit upon and formed a 
cornerstone of all offensive manoeuvres from early 1915 onwards.  
 
An understanding of this rapid and astonishing transformation is central to any 
understanding of the great dynamism which thrived on the Western Front. 
 
 
 
 
 
